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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant David J. Allen ("Appellant Allen") appeals a final Order and Decree 
Quieting Title of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah in favor 
of Appellees Thomas K. Hall ("Appellee Hall") and Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. 
("Appellee Homecomings"). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), this matter having been transferred to the Court of 
Appeals by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Whether the District court erred in extinguishing Appellant Allen's property 
rights in real property based upon alleged ambiguity in a decree of divorce. The standard of 
review for this issue, as a conclusion of law, is that the trial court's findings be accorded no 
particular deference by the appellate court, but that they be reviewed for correctness. 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). 
Issue 2. Whether the District court erred in disallowing Appellant Allen's property 
rights in real property based upon laches, estoppel and unjust enrichment. The standard of 
review for this issue, as a conclusion of law, is that the trial court's findings be accorded no 
particular deference by the appellate court, but that they be reviewed for correctness. Trujillo 
v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992); Wade v. StangL 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 
1994). 
Issue 3. Whether the District court erred in finding that a representation in bankruptcy 
regarding the value of property is a basis for extinguishing or nullifying Appellant Allen's 
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v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992); Wade v. StangL 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 
1994). 
Issue 7. Whether the District court erred in finding that the Defendant and Appellee 
was entitled to any recovery under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, Utah Code Ann. §57-
6-1 et.seq. The standard of review for this issue, as a conclusion of law, is that the trial 
court's findings be accorded no particular deference by the appellate court, but that they be 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative or of central importance to this 
appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-102(1): Each document executed, acknowledged, and 
certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, each original document or certified 
copy of a document complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, 
each copy of a notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing 
statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall, 
from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all 
persons of their contents. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-6-1 et.seq. Utah Occupying Claimants Act. See Addendem 
Exhibit "A." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Allen appeals a final Order and Decree Quieting Title of the Honorable 
Tyrone E. Medley of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
This action arises under common law and statutory interpretation. 
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Appellee Hall brought a third party claim against Colonial Title Insurance Agency, 
Michael E. Huber and Satterfield seeking indemnification for any loss sustained by him if 
Appellant Allen were to prevail. The third party complaint against Colonial Title Insurance 
Agency and Michael E. Huber was dismissed on summary judgment. 
Appellee Homecomings answered the allegations of the Complaint denying the same. 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley on May 20,2003. The 
district court entered its Order and Decree Quieting Title on July 2,2003. The district court 
denied Appellant Allen's claims, awarded title to the Property to Appellee Hall, found 
Appellee Hall's claim under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act to be moot inasmuch as title 
to the Property was awarded to Appellee Hall and denied Appellee Hall's claim for damages. 
The district court did not rule on Appellee Hall's third party claim against Satterfield, 
presumably because it also would be moot inasmuch as title to the Property was awarded to 
Appellee Hall. 
Appellant Allen appealed the district court's decision to this Court. Appellant Allen 
asks this Court to reverse the district court. 
Statement of Facts 
On or about May 15, 1989, Appellant Allen acquired the real property which is 
located at 10159 Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah 84092 (the "Property"). Record Page 564 (14-
15). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
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The Decree of Divorce provides that if ownership of the Property reverts to Appellant 
Allen, he will sell the Property and divide the proceeds with Satterfield The Satterfield Quit 
Claim Deed makes no mention of this provision. Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 
6. 
On or about January 19,1998, Satterfield executed a Quit Claim Deed transferring her 
interest in the Property to Appellee Hall (the "Hall Quit Claim Deed"). The Hall Quit Claim 
Deed was duly filed with and recorded by the Salt Lake County Recorder on June 23,1999. 
On or about June 7, 1999, Appellee Hall and his wife, Elizabeth J. Hall, executed a 
Deed of Trust conveying a security interest in the Property to Appellee Homecomings to 
secure the repayment of a loan to Appellee Hall by Appellee Homecomings. The Deed of 
Trust was duly filed with and recorded by the Salt Lake County Recorder on June 23,1999. 
On or about July 15,1999, Satterfield moved from Salt Lake City to Durham, North 
Carolina, which is more than 50 miles away from Salt Lake City, Utah. Record Page 564 
(27-28). Plaintiffs Exhibit 7. 
The last child of Appellant Allen and Satterfield attained the age of 18 years on 
August 26,2003. Record Page 564 (27-28). Plaintiffs Exhibit 7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant Allen has a reversionary interest in real property. The Decree of Divorce 
describes what he is to do with the Property upon its reversion to him. A finding by the 
district court that the Decree of Divorce is ambiguous may be a basis for directing what 
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failed to make the requisite findings of value added to the Property as a result of 
improvements which Appellee Hall alleged to have made. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN EXTINGUISHING APPELLANT ALLEN'S 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN REAL PROPERTY BASED UPON ALLEGED AMBIGUITY IN 
DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
The district court found that the Decree of Divorce to be ambiguous and because of 
that extinguished Appellant Allen's property right. 
The Decree of Divorce is a contract. Thus the Decree of Divorce should be 
interpreted as a contract. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISALLOWING APPELLANT ALLEN'S 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN REAL PROPERTY BASED UPON LACHES, ESTOPPEL AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
The district court held that Appellant Allen's claims to the Property were disallowed 
based on laches, estoppel and unjust enrichment. 
Laches. The doctrine of laches is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim which, 
taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party, 
operates as bar in court of equity. See Black's Law Dictionary 875 (6th ed. 1990). The 
district court appears to conclude that Appellant Allen failed to timely assert his right or 
claim to the Property. This conclusion is error. Appellant Allen's reversionary interest only 
matures upon the occurrence of the triggering event. Until that time, Appellant Allen had 
a future interest and no present right to assert any claim to the Property or to interfere with 
Satterfield's dealings with the Property. Therefore, Appellant Allen cannot be charged with 
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because he did not give actual notice to Appellee Hall of the reversionary interest and 
because he did not take appropriate action to clarify his rights under the Decree of Divorce. 
This conclusion is error. As to issue of notice, for the reasons recited under the heading 
"Laches" above, Appellant Allen should not be estopped from asserting his claim to his 
reversionary interest in the Property and his share of the equity in the property. 
As to the issue of clarifying his rights under the Decree of Divorce, the substance is 
really one of notice. If the Decree of Divorce is ambiguous, it is ambiguous and there is no 
issue of estoppel. On the other hand, if the Decree of Divorce is not ambiguous, then it 
speaks for itself and to suggest the Appellant Allen has any duty to clarify his rights under 
the Decree of Divorce is simply another way of suggesting that Appellant Allen had a duty 
to notify Appellee Hall of the rights under the Decree of Divorce. For the reasons set forth 
in Section V of this brief, Appellee Hall had notice of Appellant Allen's reversionary interest 
in the Property and the Decree of Divorce and failed to act in a reasonable and prudent 
manner. 
There is no evidence in the record that Appellee Hall even considered the Decree of 
Divorce until it was brought to his attention in connection with his refinance. Neither is there 
any evidence in the record the Appellee Hall made any effort to contact Appellant Allen 
concerning the reversionary interest or the Decree of Divorce once he did become aware of 
them. 
Unjust Enrichment. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a general principle that one 
persona should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another, but 
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To prove unjust enrichment, it must be shown that Appellant Allen had the requisite 
appreciation or knowledge of the benefit. If the benefit is construed to be the equity to which 
Appellant Allen was entitled by the Decree of Divorce, he was certainly aware of his rights. 
However, for the reasons recited above, it is unreasonable to consider that a benefit for 
purposes of unjust enrichment. This right was in existence, albeit contingent, at the time that 
Appellee Hall acquired his interest in the Property. It should be noted that Satterfield quit 
claimed her interest in the Property to Appellee Hall, thereby further suggesting to the 
reasonable and prudent man the possibility of something less than full ownership. 
Furthermore, Appellee Hall had constructive notice pursuant to the recording statute of 
Appellant Allen's reversionary interest in the Property and therefore Appellee Hall cannot 
claim that the termination of Appellee Hall's fee simple determinable estate in the Property 
bestows an inequitable benefit upon Appellant Allen. 
If the benefit is construed to be an increase in the equity resulting from improvements 
to the Property which were made by Hall, then certainly Appellant Allen did not have the 
requisite appreciation or knowledge of the benefit. The record shows that Appellant Allen 
spoke to Appellee Hall two days after Appellee Hall purchased the Property and did not have 
any contact with Appellee Hall until after the occurrence of the triggering event resulting in 
the reversion of the Property to Appellant Allen. The record is devoid of any evidence 
suggesting that Appellant Allen was aware of any such benefit. 
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is no evidence in the record to suggest that Appellant Allen was even aware of Satterfield's 
bankruptcy. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, 
PERTAINING TO THE DIVORCE OF APPELLANT ALLEN AND HIS FORMER 
SPOUSE, AMBIGUOUS. 
Ambiguity means doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning. See Black's Law Dictionary 
79 (6th ed. 1990). An agreement is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings, of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies.'" Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). 
The district court found that the Decree of Divorce did not preclude Satterfield from 
mortgaging, refinancing, selling or liquidating her equity in the Property. This is true. 
However, the district court did not find nor does the record support any finding that the 
Decree of Divorce allowed Satterfield to mortgage, refinance, sell or liquidate Appellant 
Allen's equity in the Property. 
When ambiguity exists, the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact. Plateau 
Mining Co. V. Utah Div. Of Sate Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
Therefore, "failure to resolve an ambiguity by determining the parties' intent from parol 
evidence is error." Id. To demonstrate ambiguity, "the contrary positions of the parties must 
each be tenable." Id. 
The second sentence of Paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce states "[t]he defendant 
[Satterfield] shall be responsible for all indebtedness and expenses therefrom, holding the 
plaintiff [Appellant Allen] harmless therefrom." This portion of the Decree of Divorce is 
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makes no sense to structure a property settlement in a marital dissolution and then read the 
provision as anything other than its intended purpose. 
When the Decree of Divorce was entered into, the Property had equity. Appellant 
Allen testified that the loan balance at that time was $75,560.17. When the property was sold 
to Appellee Hall, Appellant Allen testified that the loan balance would have been 
$68,455.42. On the day of the trial, Appellant Allen testified that the loan balance would 
have been $58,759.60. 
The district court erred in finding that the Decree of Divorce was ambiguous. The 
district court ignores the property issue by making the unlikely leap from a finding of 
ambiguity in the Decree of Divorce to a determination that Appellant Allen's property rights 
are a "so what." Ambiguity is not a basis for the nullification of property rights. There is no 
ambiguity in the Satterfield Quit Claim Deed or in the Decree of Divorce as to the ownership 
of the Property and the property rights. Upon the occurrence of the triggering events, the 
property rights automatically revert to Appellant Allen. Appellant Allen is the owner of the 
Property. 
Satterfield had the ability under the Decree of Divorce to deal with her interest in the 
property. The interest is a fee simple determinable, subject to a right of reversion; a right to 
one-half of the equity in the Property and a right to the other one-half of the equity in the 
Property if 
Upon the occurrence of the triggering events, Appellant Allen is entitled to one-half 
of the equity in the property. 
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Appellant Allen was to inform third parties of Appellant Allen's reversionary interest in the 
Property. 
The district court's holding on this matter stands for the proposition that a person with 
an interest in real property cannot rely upon the recording statutes to give notice of that 
interest but must give actual notice to persons whose interest in the property may be affected 
thereby. This is error and contrary to all accepted law in Utah. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AN OWNER OF REAL 
PROPERTY CAN CONVEY MORE RIGHTS AND TITLES TO THE PROPERTY THAN 
THE PERSON HOLDS. 
Satterfield did nothing to enhance her title to the Property during the time that she held 
title. Satterfield could only convey the title to the Property that she received from Appellant 
Allen, i.e. title subject to Appellant Allen's reversionary interest. In fact, Satterfield quit-
claimed her interest to Appellee Hall, without any warranties. 
Appellee Hall did nothing to enhance his title to the Property during the time that he 
held title. Appellee Hall can only convey the title to the Property that he received from 
Satterfield, i.e. title subject to Appellant Allen's reversionary interest. Appellee Hall's 
conveyance of a trust deed interest to Appellee Homecomings is likewise subject to 
Appellant Allen's reversionary interest. 
The Satterfield Quit Claim Deed conveyed a fee simple determinable estate, subject 
to Appellant Allen's reversionary interest in the Property, to Satterfield from Appellant 
Allen. See Restatement of Property §23 (1936). 
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concluded that but for title to the property being quieted in Appellee Hall, he would be 
entitled to be reimbursed in the amount of $59,254.03 under the Utah Occupying Claimant's 
Act. The district court erred in reaching this conclusion. 
Appellee Hall is not entitled to recover under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act 
because Appellee Hall did not meet the statutory requirements of that Act. See Utah Code 
Ann. §57-6-1. This statute requires claimants under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act to 
show that they (i) have "color of title" and (ii) made valuable improvements (iii) in good 
faith. See Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. V. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah 1979). 
Utah Code Ann. §57-6-4, defines "color of title." Appellee Hall likely has color of 
title to the Property. 
The second requirement of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act is that the claimant 
make valuable improvements to the Property. This requirement is set out in Utah Code Ann. 
§57-6-2, which provides that the complaint state the value of the real estate, exclusive of the 
improvements thereon made by the claimant and the value of such improvements. "The 
issues joined thereon must be tried as in law actions, and the value of the real estate and of 
such improvements must be separately ascertained on the trial." The district court erred in 
failing to find the value of the real estate, exclusive of the improvements, and the value of 
the improvements. The court merely identified the alleged cost of the improvements as 
presented by Appellee Hall. This finding is insufficient to comply with the requirements of 
the Utah Occupying Claimants Act because cost is a concept distinguishable from value. For 
example, a homeowner may spend $10,000.00 (cost) for a new deck but the addition of the 
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and Appellee Homecomings. Appellant Allen is entitled to the Property free of all claims 
by or through Satterfield. 
Appellee Hall had notice of Appellant Allen's reversionary interest pursuant to the 
recording statutes and therefore his interest in the Property is subject to the reversionary 
interest. Appellee Hall is not entitled to any recovery from Appellant Allen pursuant to a 
claim for unjust enrichment, he is not entitled to any recovery under the Utah Occupying 
Claimants Act, and he is not entitled to any damages. Appellee Hall may be entitled to a 
recovery from Satterfield. 
Appellee Homecomings claims its interest in the Property through Appellee Hall and 
ultimately through Satterfield and therefore its interest must fail with the termination of 
Satterfield's interest and Appellee Hall's interest. 
The district court was more than anxious to apply its notion of equity in this matter 
but in its desire to protect Appellee Hall from his own error, i.e. failing to review the title to 
the Property, it has laid all of the burden on Appellant Allen who complied with every legal 
requirement in the matter. Appellant Allen gave the Property to Satterfield provided that he 
would get 50 percent of the equity of the Property if Satterfield didn't perform her 
obligations. This is not a case of Appellant Allen and Satterfield conniving with one another 
to entrap some poor, unsuspecting victim. Notice of their bargain was given to all the world. 
Unfortunately, Appellee Hall made a mistake and instead of paying for that mistake as would 
be required by law, he is bailed out of his bungle by the district court. 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit "A" - Utah Occupying Claimants Act 
EXHIBIT "A" 
UTAH OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS ACT 
57-6-1- Stay of execution of judgment of possession-
Where an occupant of real estate has color of title to the real estate, and in good 
faith has made valuable improvements on the real estate, and is afterwards in a proper 
action found not to be the owner, no execution shall issue to put the owner in possession 
of the real estate after the filing of a complaint as hereinafter provided, until the 
provisions of this chapter have been complied with. 
57-6-2. Claimant to commence action — Complaint — Trial of issues. 
Such complaint must set forth the grounds on which the defendant seeks relief, 
stating as accurately as practicable the value of the real estate, exclusive of the 
improvements thereon made by the claimant or his grantors, and the value of such 
improvements. The issues joined thereon must be tried as in law actions, and the value of 
the real estate and of such improvements must be separately ascertained on the trial. 
57-6-3. Rights of parties — Acquiring other's interest or holding as tenants in 
common. 
The plaintiff in the main action may thereupon pay the appraised value of the 
improvements and take the property, but should he fail to do so after a reasonable time, to 
be fixed by the court, the defendant may take the property upon paying its value, 
exclusive of the improvements. If this is not done within a reasonable time, to be fixed by 
the court, the parties will be held to be tenants in common of all the real estate, including 
the improvements, each holding an interest proportionate to the values ascertained on the 
trial. 
57-6-4. Certain persons considered to hold under color of title. 
(1) A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale made by the proper person 
or officer has color of title within the meaning of this chapter, whether or not the person 
or officer has sufficient authority to sell, unless the want of authority was known to the 
purchaser at the time of the sale. 
(2) (a) Any person has color of title who has occupied a tract of real estate by 
himself, or by those under whom he claims, for the term of five years, or who has 
occupied it for less time, if he, or those under whom he claims, have at any time during 
the occupancy with the knowledge or consent, express or implied, of the real owner made 
any valuable improvements on the real estate, or if he or those under whom he claims 
have at any time during the occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes on the real estate for 
any one year, and two years have elapsed without a repayment by the owner, and the 
occupancy is continued up to the time at which the action is brought by which the 
recovery of the real estate is obtained. 
(b) The person's rights shall pass to his assignees or representatives. 
A - l 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give tenants color of title against 
their landlords or give any person a claim under color of title to school or institutional 
trust lands as defined in Subsection 53C-1-103(6). 
57-6-5. Settlers under state or federal law or contract deemed occupying 
claimants. 
When any person has settled upon any real estate and occupied the same for three 
years under or by virtue of any law or contract with the proper officers of the state for the 
purchase thereof, or under any law of, or by virtue of any purchase from, the United 
States, and shall have made valuable improvements thereon, and shall be found not to be 
the owner thereof, or not to have acquired a right to purchase the same from the state or 
the United States, such person shall be an occupying claimant within the meaning of this 
chapter. 
57-6-6. Setoff against claim for improvements. 
In the cases above provided for, if the occupying claimant has committed any 
injury to the real estate by cutting timber, or otherwise, the plaintiff may set the same off 
against any claim for improvements made by the claimant. 
57-6-7. When execution on judgment of possession may issue. 
The plaintiff in the main action is entitled to an execution to put him in possession 
of his property in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, but not otherwise. 
57-6-8. Improvements made by occupants of land granted to state. 
Any person having improvements on any real estate granted to the state in aid of 
any work of internal improvement, whose title thereto is questioned by another, may 
remove such improvements without injury otherwise to such real estate, at any time 
before he is evicted therefrom, or he may claim and have the benefit of this chapter by 
proceeding as herein directed. 
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